several divisions, which they added to their reserves.
They threw up fresh entrenchments behind their first system of defence at the point of expected attack.
They also accumulated masses of guns and ammuni-
tion behind the threatened section. The delay transformed the whole character of the operation.
The distinctive features of the Nivelle strategy gradually vanished, and the lumber of the Joffre-Haig military ideals was restored—only with a more difficult terrain substituted. The only point of removing the sphere of attack was not because the ground was more propitious, but because the onslaught if made at this point would not be expected by the enemy.
Once that advantage was thrown away there were only two alternatives. One was to seek another terrain of attack on the Western Front. The other was to abandon altogether the idea of a great offensive this year in the France and Flanders areas and concentrate on another theatre or theatres of the War. The final and fatal error committed by France and Britain was not to decide upon one of these alternatives. The second course—a combined Allied offensive against Austria on the Italian Front—was suggested by three eminent French Generals, including General Petain, but only after the British troops had already started their bombardment.
That was one but not the only reason why the idea was not communicated to the British

Government.

Who and what was responsible for the delay that wrecked the chances of success ? It was largely due to the workings of a divided command, *Responsibility for delay*. This was my first effort to establish Unity of Command. It was resisted so viciously by Haig and Robertson that the delays caused by the time spent in allaying suspicions and